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Although Canada and the United States are self-declared immigration 
countries, their means of regulating admissions are quite different. 
Whereas the United States privileges family reunification, Canada's 
"points system" grants policymakers greater flexibility in tailoring 
immigration flows to meet changing economic needs. This paper 
explores the origins of these distinct approaches. 
I argue that the two states' policies share similar roots: In the 
post-World War II era, changing nonns pertaining to race, ethnicity, and 
human rights cast longstanding discriminatory policies in a highly 
critical light. l ) 
l) Both states regulated migration so as to exclude non-whites and favour "Nordic races" 
- i.e. groups from northern and western Europe. The United States' National Origins 
Quota Acts also ranked European "races" immigrants from southern and eastern Europe 
were deemed inferior and therefore subject to strict restrictions. While Canada also dis-
criminated against southern and Eastern Europeans, there was no fonnal system devised 
for restricting their admission. Rather, policy was adjusted according to economic de-
mands, with "non-preferred" Europeans accepted during economic good times and ex-
cluded during downturns. For details see Triadafilos Triadafilopoulos, "Building Walls, 
Bounding Nations: Migration and Exclusion in Canada and Germany, 1870-1939," 
Journal of Historical Sociology VOL. 17, No. 4 (2004): 385-427; Mae Ngai, "The 
Architecture of Race in American Immigration Law: A Reexamination of the 
Immigration Act of 1924," The Journal of American History VOL. 86 (June 1999): 
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Opponents of racial discrimination in immigration policy took 
advantage of this new normative context to highlight the lack of fit 
between Canada and the United States' postwar commitments to liberal 
norms and human rights and their extant policy regimes. This pressure 
prompted comparable processes of policy "stretching" and "unraveling," 
which culminated in policy "shifting" in the mid- l 960s. Unraveling and 
shifting were, however, subject to quite different political dynamics. 
Canada's institutional configuration granted the executive branch and 
bureaucracy a high degree of autonomy and policy change accorded to 
models of elite learning. 2) Conversely, the greater openness of the 
American political system and the pivotal role of Congressional 
committees led to a more politicized process. As a result, the executive 
branch's efforts to recast irnrnigration policy in economic terms, as in 
Canada, failed. The result was a patchwork policy that aimed to mollify 
distinct and conflicting interests. 
This difference in policy outcomes would have important 
consequences. Critics of American irnrnigration policy claim that the 
1965 Immigration Act's preference for family reunification has led to a 
"precipitous decline . . . in the average skills of the irnrnigrant flow 
reaching the United States," which, in turn, has "helped rekindle the 
debate over irnrnigration policy."3) Conversely, the Canadian system's 
relatively successful linking of irnrnigrant admissions and economic 
needs has helped maintain a remarkable degree of acceptance for mass 
67-92. 
2) In elite learning policy change is driven by experts in a given field of policy, either 
working for the state or at the interface between the bureaucracy and the intellectual 
enclaves of society. See Hugh Heclo, Modem Social Politics in Britain and Sweden 
(New Haven: Yale University Press, 1974), 305-306. 
3) George 1. Boljas, Heaven's Door: Immigration and the American Economy (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1999), 8. 
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immigration In Canada. Indeed, Canada's points system has become 
something of a model for other cOWltries fonnulating organized 
immigration policies.4) 
I begin by outlining my argument regarding the interplay of shifting 
nonnative contexts and domestic politics, noting its relation to the 
extant literature on postwar immigration policymaking. I then apply the 
argument to better Wlderstand postwar immigration policymaking in 
Canada and the United States. I conclude by reiterating the paper's 
argument and summarizing the results of the case studies. 
Argument and Analytical Framework 
1he Migration-Membership Dilemma 
In a world of nation-states international migration is a subversive 
process. Whereas migrants may be used to meet labor market 
requirements, keep production costs low, and serve related economic 
purposes, the satisfaction of these economic interests can, and often 
does, provoke negative reactions not only among actors with conflicting 
material interests, but also among those who view immigration as a 
threat to commWlal stability and societal integration. Efforts to address 
this clash of distinct interests and concerns drive the politics of 
membership. In this respect, immigration and citizenship policies 
represent answers to the very basic questions provoked by the 
migration-membership dilemma: "What are we? What do we wish to 
become? Which individuals can help us reach that goal? And most 
fundamentally: Which individuals constitute the 'we' who shall decide 
4) Ayelet Shachar, "The Race for Talent: Highly Skilled Migrants and Competitive 
Immigration Regimes," New York University Law Review Vol. 81 (2006): 101-158. 
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these questions?"5) 
Normative Contexts 
How polities respond to these questions depends on a host of factors, 
including regime type, traditions of nationhood, and economic 
requirements. Limiting our attention to these domestic variables, 
however, obscures more encompassing material, political, and ideational 
structures that influence outcomes across states. As Aristide Zolberg has 
noted, domestic policymaking "takes place within the context provided 
by changing conditions in the world at large. Hence ... analysis must 
take into account the configuration of international conditions that 
generates changing opportunities and challenges in relation to . . . 
immigration."6) Alan Cairns'work on the transformation of indigenous 
peoples' politics in Canada and other settler countries proceeds in a 
similar direction. In Citizens Plus, Cairns argues that the dramatic 
contrast in historic assumptions governing Aboriginal/non-Aboriginal 
relations in Canada cannot be understood without recognizing the 
impact of changing international norms, and in particular the demise of 
European colonialism.7) Cairns develops this insight by making a useful 
distinction between the global culture of the late nineteenth and early 
twentieth century and that of the period after World War II. Both 
periods were marked by globalization and "diversity," but they differed 
5) Peter Schuck, "Immigration Law and the Problem of Community," in Clamor at the 
Gates: The New American Immigration, ed. Nathan Glazer (San Francisco: ICS Press, 
1985), 285-286. 
6) Aristide R. Zolberg, "A Nation by Design: Immigration Policy in the Fashioning of 
America," (paper presented at the 2002 meeting of the American Political Science 
Association): 4-5. 
7) Alan C. Cairns, Citizens Plus: Aboriginal Peoples and the Canadian State (Vancouver: 
University of British Columbia Press, 2000), 41. 
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significantly in their prevailing attitudes toward diversity. 
My understanding of "normative contexts" builds on these insights. 
Normative contexts are complex configurations of global structures, 
processes, and beliefs that serve as background conditions informing 
domestic policymaking. Shifts in normative contexts throw policies 
enacted under older conditions into doubt, as the "common sense" of 
one era may be rendered highly problematic in another as a result of 
changes in what constitutes appropriate conduct. 
I distinguish between two periods with distinct normative contexts. 
The first spans the tum of the twentieth century until the Second World 
War. The second emerges as a consequence of the war and related 
developments, including the Holocaust, decolonization, and the 
emergence of a global human rights culture. Both contexts had a 
profound effect on immigration and citizenship policies in Canada and 
the United States. Solutions to the migration-membership dilemma 
devised during the early part of the twentieth century were influenced 
by prevailing attitudes toward racial and ethnic difference, nationalism, 
and state sovereignty, tending, on the whole, to legitimize 
discriminatory exclusions. Conversely, the discrediting of scientific 
racism, integral nationalism and white supremacy, and the simultaneous 
emergence of human rights after the war problematized efforts to 
structure policies along familiar lines and granted leverage to reformers. 
Canada and the United States'identification as liberal democratic 
countries that respected human rights made them especially vulnerable 
to charges of hypocrisy. This is not to say that racial discrimination 
disappeared after World War II; rather, the discrediting of racism and 
integral nationalism as legitimizing principles made racialized categories 
much harder to defend and maintain in the face of criticism. 
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Stretching, Unraveling, and Shifting 
How did this change in nonnative structure influence immigration 
policymaking in Canada and the United States? To answer this question 
I advance an analytical framework that breaks the process down into 
three stages, which I refer to as "stretching," "unraveling," and 
"shifting. "8) 
The concept of stretching speaks to the durability of entrenched policy 
paradigms and their propensity to channel policymaking along well 
worn paths.9) Existing policy paradigms 
define the broad goals behind policy, the problems to be tackled, and the 
instruments to be deployed, as well as mapping the respective re-
sponsibilities of the state, market and citizens in meeting societal challenges. 
Once institutionalized, a governance paradigm channels the thoughts and ac-
tions of a range of state and societal actors, reflecting shared policy knowl-
edge and habitual decision-making routines. The result is broad continuity 
in both content and process of public policy.IO) 
8) My approach draws on insights from historical institutionalism, generally, and Peter 
Hall's theory of "paradigm shift," in particular. See Kathleen Thelen and Sven Steinmo, 
"Historical Institutionalism in Comparative Politics," in Structuring Politics: Historical 
Institutionalism in Comparative Analysis, ed. Sven Steinmo, Kathleen Thelen, and Frank 
Longstreth (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992); Peter A. Hall, "Policy 
Paradigms, Social Learning and the State: The Case of Economic Policymaking in 
Britain," Comparative Politics VOL. 25, No.3 (April 1993): 275-296; Peter Hall, 
"Policy Paradigms, Experts, and the State: The Case of Macroeconomic Policymaking 
in Britain," in Social Scientists, Policy, and the State, ed. Stephen Brooks and Alain-G. 
Gagnon (Westport: Connecticut: Praeger, 1990). 
9) David Wilsford, "Path Dependency, or Why History Makes it Difficult but Not 
Impossible to Reform Health Care Systems in a Big Way," Journal of Public Policy 
VOL. 14, No.3 (1994): 251. 
10) Neil Bradford, "Public-Private Partnership? Shifting Paradigms of Economic 
Governance in Ontario," Canadian Journal of Political Science VOL. 36, No. 5 
(December 2003): 1006. 
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Changes in nonnative contexts did not compel policymakers to 
immediately begin searching for radically new solutions. Rather, their 
initial response was to "stretch" established policies to conceal 
anomalies generated by lack of fit without abandoning the fundamental 
premises of extant policy frameworks. I I) Cosmetic reforms aimed at 
co-opting criticism while avoiding fundamental transfonnation. 
These initial responses had unintended effects that accelerated the 
breakdown of established policy frameworks. Attempts to answer critics 
with "tactical concessions" affinned the nonnative validity of their 
claims, increasing pressure for more substantive reforms. 12) Policy 
stretching thus gave rise to unraveling, as an expanding constellation of 
critics pulled more detenninedly at the most vulnerable strands of 
existing policy regimes. The unraveling of established policy 
frameworks increased demands for innovative strategies, opening space 
for the introduction of policies in line with the ascendant nonnative 
context. 13) The fonnulation and implementation of new approaches 
marked the transition from wrraveling to shifting. 
Unraveling and shifting were, however, subject to quite different 
political dynamics. In Canada, "[0 ]ne party government in a parlia-
mentary system ... tended to reinforce the effects of executive pol i-
cymaking by dramatically curtailing avenues for challenging . . . 
policies."14) Conversely, divided government in the United States 
II) Hall , "Policy Paradigms, Experts, and the State," 61; Hall, "Policy Paradigms, Social 
Learning and the State," 277-280. 
12) Thomas Risse, "International Norms and Domestic Change: Arguing and 
Communicative Behavior in the Human Rights Arena," Politics and Society VOL. 27, 
No. 4 (December 1999): 538. 
13) Neil Bradford, Commissioning Ideas: Canadian National Policy Innovation in 
Comparative Perspective (Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1998): 13; Judith 
Goldstein, "The Impact of Ideas on Trade Policy: The Origins of U.S. Agricultural and 
Manufacturing Policies," International Organization VOL. 43, No. I (Winter 1989): 32. 
100 Triadafilos Triadafilopoulos 
limited the executive branch's ability to shape policy. Thus, even when 
American restrictionists found themselves at a disadvantage, in terms of 
prevailing elite opinion and legislative majorities, they were still able to 
exact important concessions through their membership in congressional 
committees and subcommittees. The lack of any comparable source of 
leverage in Canada muted potential dissenters ' voices, granting Cana-
dian policymakers wide latitude in crafting alternatives to established 
policies. 
My argument connects several competing claims about the sources of 
immigration policymaking in the postwar period and offers a way out 
of the impasse that has marked recent debates in this field of enquiry. 
In the following section, I summarize rival approaches and identify their 
respective strengths and weaknesses in order to highlight the advantages 
of the integrative approach developed here. 
Bridging the Internal-External Divide 
In her influential book Limits of Citizenship, Yasemin Soysal argues 
that the proliferation of global human rights instruments in the postwar 
period has brought forth a "new and more universal concept of 
citizenship ... whose legitimizing principles are based on universal 
personhood rather than national belonging."15) Postwar changes in the 
organization and ideologies of the global system "have increasingly 
shifted the institutional and normative basis of citizenship to a 
transnational level and . . . extended rights and privileges associated with 
it beyond national boundaries."16) This has led to the de-coupling of 
14) Ninette Kelley and Michael Trebilcock, The Making of the Mosaic: A History of 
Canadian Immigration Policy (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2(00), 449. 
15) Yasemin Nuhoglu Soysal, Limits of Citizenship: Migrants and Postnational 
Membership in Europe (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1994), I. 
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membership rights and national citizenship.17) 
According to Soysal's "postnational model," the key factors animating 
contemporary membership politics are located outside the state. As 
transnational forces generated by global culture and economic 
globalization erode the traditional basis of nation-state membership, 
"postnational" forms, legitimated by international codes, conventions, 
and laws on human rights, fill the breach. IS) Soysal and others, 
including David Jacobson and Saskia Sassen, thus reduce the state's role 
in this process to one of implementing and enforcing what are, in 
essence, global norms. In Sassen's words, "the legitimization process of 
states under the rule of law calls for respect and enforcement of 
international human rights codes, regardless of the nationality and legal 
status of the individual (emphasis added)."19) 
This "externalist" argument provoked a strong reaction among 
"internalists," who offer a very different take on the forces underlying 
membership politics. In a pointed reply to Soysal, Jacobson, and Sassen, 
Christian Joppke argues that states with robust liberal infrastructures 
have no need to resort to international norms: 
All Western constitutions contain a catalogue of elementary human 
rights, independent of citizenship, which are to be protected by the state and 
16) Yasemin Nuhoglu Soysal, "Changing Citizenship in Europe: Remarks on Postnational 
Membership and the National State," in Citizenship. Nationality and Migration in 
Europe, ed. David Ceasarini and Mary Fulbrook (London and New York: Routledge, 
1996), 21. 
17) Soysal, Limits of Citizenship, 3. 
18) David Jacobson, Rights Across Borders: Immigration and the. Decline of Citizenship 
(Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996), 9. 
19) Saskia Sassen, "The de facto Transnationalizing of Immigration Policy," in Cha/lengeto 
the Nation-State: Immigration in Western Europe and the United States, ed. Christian 
Joppke (New York: Oxford University Press, 1998), 72. 
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thus limit its discretionary power. Universal human rights are not the in-
vention of the United Nations in 1945, but of liberal nation-states in the late 
eighteenth century.20) 
Joppke and other internalists maintain that the expansion of 
membership regimes in the post-World War II era has marked the 
unfolding of domestic liberal principles that have tended to ameliorate 
exclusions even in ethno-cultural nation-states such as Germany.2l) 
Courts have tended to drive the emergence of this immigrant-friendly 
liberalism.22) Unlike the executive and legislative branches of 
government, the judiciary is shielded from populist sentiments in civil 
society. As such, judges have often been the defenders of nationals and 
(select) non-nationals alike. The "decline of sovereignty" diagnosed by 
extemalists is therefore strictly a domestic affair: sovereignty is 
"self-limited" through the judiciary's extension of domestic liberal rights 
to immigrants. 
Both positions have their respective strengths and weaknesses. Soysal, 
Jacobson, and Sassen help us understand how new normative standards 
woven into an increasingly "thick" global culture confront exclusions 
based on tradition and give marginal actors a means of legitimizing their 
claims. States can no longer treat foreign workers as mere means, but 
20) Christian Joppke, "Immigration Challenges the Nation-State," in Challenge to the 
Nation-State: Immigration in Western Europe and the United States, ed. Christian 
Joppke (New York: Oxford University Press, 1998), 18 
21) James F. Hollifield, Immigrants. Markets. and States: The Political Economy of Postwar 
Europe (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1992); Gary Freeman, "Modes of 
Immigration Politics in Liberal Democratic Societies," International Migration Review 
VOL. 29, No.4 (1995): 881-902. 
22) Christian Joppke, "The Legal-Domestic Sources of Immigrant Rights: The United 
States, Germany, and the European Union," Comparative Political Studies VOL. 34, 
No.4 (May 2001): 339-336. 
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are obliged to recognize them also as ends in themselves. The result is 
a blurring of traditional insider-outsider distinctions and, in some cases, 
a fairer distribution of rights to nationals and non-nationals alike. 
While there is no gainsaying the power of this claim, externalists ' 
neglect of politics also leaves them vulnerable to criticism. The story 
told by these scholars is one of general consensus: in a world in which 
human rights norms increasingly dictate policy outcomes, politics loses 
its importance. Indeed, traditional political actors (e.g. parties) and 
processes (e.g. elections) barely figure in their accounts. This disregard 
for politics is not entirely surprising: if the force of world culture 
posited by externalists were as powerful as they claim, normative 
contestation should gradually give way to rational consensus.23) Yet, for 
better or worse, partisanship, contestation and politics continue to play 
a key role in determining the status and scope of rights accorded to 
migrants - perhaps more so now than at any other time since World 
War II. Failure to incorporate domestic political processes into their 
arguments leaves externalists unable to account for this or to explain 
significant variations in the rights accorded to foreigners in different 
immigrant receiving countries.24) 
Proponents of the liberal state thesis rightly draw our attention to the 
fact that human rights claims have been most effective in states that 
already uphold a commitment to liberal democracy.25) International 
23) Martha Finnemore, "Nonns, Culture, and World Politics: Insights from Sociology 's 
Institutionalism," International OrganizationVOL. 50, No.2 (Spring 1996): 343 . 
24) Amy Gurowitz, "Mobilizing International Nonns: Domestic Actors, Immigrants, and the 
Japanese State," World Politics VOL. 51 (April 1999): 414-415; Kai Alderson, 
"Making Sense of State Socialization," Review of International Studies VOL. 27 
(200 I): 416. 
25) Christian Joppke, "Why Liberal States Accept Unwanted Immigration," World Politics 
50 (January 1998): 268-269; Myron Weiner, The Global Migration Crisis (New York: 
Harper Collins, 1995), 80-83. 
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hwnan rights offer little comfort for migrants in states outside of the 
liberal democratic fold .26) However, attributing causal primacy 
exclusively to domestic liberal structures and traditions neglects 
important changes in liberal states ' conduct over time.27) Even a cursory 
review of immigration and citizenship politics in liberal states during the 
first half of the twentieth century demonstrates that "liberal" countries 
engaged in grossly illiberal practices against immigrants and other 
minorities.28) Contrary to the intemalists, these policies were not simply 
the product of legislatures and executives pressured by populist forces. 
As Ian Haney-Lopez and others have convincingly shown, courts in the 
United States and elsewhere were critical actors in the erection and 
perpetuation of blatantly illiberal, racially defined exclusions.29) Indeed, 
the rather sanguine foundation upon which Joppke and others base their 
understanding of liberalism and liberal states has come under withering 
attack by a nwnber of historians, social scientists, and political 
philosophers. 30) There is growing agreement among these scholars that 
26) Amy Gurowitz. "Mobilizing International Norms: Domestic Actors. Immigrants and the 
State." (Ph.D. dissertation. University of California. Berkeley. 1999). 
27) Sassen. "The de Jacto Transnationalizing of Immigration Policy." 70; Rogers Brubaker. 
"Comment on 'Modes of Immigration Politics in Liberal Democratic States· ... 
International Migration Review VOL. 29. No.4 (Winter 1995): 909-913. 
28} Aristide R. Zolberg. "Global Movements. Global Walls: Responses to Migration. 
1885-1925." in Global History and Migrations. ed. Wang Gungwu (Boulder. Colorado: 
Westview Press. 1997). 279-303. 
29} Ian Hany-LOpez. White by Law: The Legal Construction oj Race (New York: New York 
University Press. I 996); Angelo N. Ancheta. Race. Rights. and the Asian American 
Experience (New Brunswick. New Jersey: Rutgers University Press. 1998). For Canada 
see James W. St. G. Walker. "Race. " Rights and the Law in the Supreme Court oj 
Canada: Historical Case Studies (Waterloo: Wilfiid Lawier University Press. I 997). 
30) See for example Rogers Smith. Civic Ideals : Conflicting Visions oj Citizenship in Us. 
History (New Haven: Yale University Press. 1997); and "Beyond Tocqueville. Myrdal. 
and Hartz: The Multiple Traditions in America." American Political Science Review 
VOL. 87. No 2 (1993): 549-566; Desmond King. Making Americans: Immigration. 
Race. and the Origins oj Diverse Democracy (Cambridge: Harvard University Press. 
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the rise of a more universal, anti-racist liberalism has only come fairly 
recently, in the second half of the twentieth century. Hence, internalists 
have little choice but to accept the core proposition underlying 
externalists ' claims: that the post-World War II period marks a 
fundamental shift in norms that has influenced the development of 
liberalism and, by extension, liberal states'regulation of membership}l ) 
By linking global and domestic levels of analysis, the approach 
developed in this article bridges the internal-external divide, recognizing 
the importance of global culture, national traditions, and liberal 
democratic norms. Policy change is not reduced to the impact of a 
particular structure - be it global culture or domestic liberalism - but 
rather as a result of the interplay of these factors in institutionally 
patterned political processes. In what follows I demonstrate the utility of 
my approach through an analysis of postwar immigration policymaking 
in Canada and the United States. 
2000); "Making Americans: Immigration Meets Race," in E Pluribus Unum? 
Contemporary and Historical Perspectives on Immigrant Political Incorporation, ed. 
Gary Gerstle and John Mollenkopf (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 2001): 
143-174; Gary Gerstle, American Crucible: Race and Nation in the Twentieth Century 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 200 I); Uday Mehta, "Liberal Strategies of 
Exclusion," Politics and Society I 8 (1990): 427-454; Liberalism and Empire: A Study 
in Nineteenth-Century British Liberal Thought (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 
1999); Emmanuel Chukwudi Eze, "The Color of Reason: The Idea of ' Race' in Kant's 
Anthropology," in Postcolonial African Philosophy: A Critical. Reader, ed. Emmanuel 
Chukwudi Eze (Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 1997). 
31) Some have already done so. See Christian Joppke, "Citizenship between De- and 
Re-Ethnicization," (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, Working Paper No. 204, 
March 2003). 
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Dismantling White Canada, 1947-1967 
Stretching: 1947-1952 
Prime Minister William Lyon Mackenzie King presented the first 
important statement on Canada's postwar immigration policy in a 
speech before Parliament on May I, 1947. According to King: 
The policy of the government is to foster the growth of the population of 
Canada by the encouragement of immigration. The government will seek by 
legislation, regulation and vigorous administration, to ensure the careful se-
lection and permanent settlement of such numbers of immigrants as can ad-
vantageously be absorbed in our national economy .... I wish to make 
quite clear that Canada is perfectly within her rights in selecting the persons 
whom we regard as desirable future citizens. It is not a "fundamental human 
right" of any alien to enter Canada. It is a privilege. It is a matter of domes-
tic pol icy .. .. There will, I am sure, be general agreement with the view 
that the people of Canada do not wish, as a result of mass immigration, to 
make a fundamental alteration in the character of our population)2) 
King's statement made clear that Canada was intent on structuring its 
immigrant admissions policies as it had in the past: "Asiatic" and other 
non-white immigration would be avoided so as to preserve Canada's 
white-European "character." 
Yet, state officials understood that changed normative conditions made 
such an approach difficult to maintainin the postwar period. A candid 
working paper bluntly laid out the dilemma confronting Canadian 
policyrnakers: "The problem of Asiatic immigration into Canada is 
twofold: an international problem of avoiding the charge of racial 
32) House of Commons Debates, (May I, 1947), 2644-2546. 
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discrimination and a domestic sociological and political problem of 
assimilation." Canada' s membership in the UN carried with it an 
"unqualified obligation to eliminate racial discrimination in its 
legislation." This effectively meant supporting the UN's goal of 
"promoting and encouraging human rights and fundamental 
freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language or 
religion." Further, Canada's statements in the General Assembly 
regarding the competency of the UN to intervene in the domestic affairs 
of member states indicated that Canada favored a "wide interpretation" 
of the provisions of the Charter. Claims to sovereign jurisdiction in 
domestic matters would therefore be open to challenge. Given the risks 
to Canadian international prestige, the brief recommended that Canada 
revise its immigration legislation "so as to avoid the charge of racial 
discrimination" while "effectively limiting Asiatic immigration as to 
prevent aggravation of the Asiatic minority problem." 
This strategy of stretching established policies to co-opt charges of 
hypocrisy would define Canadian immigration policymaking in the early 
postwar period. For instance, pressure from the Committee for the 
Repeal of the Chinese Immigration Act moved the government to strike 
the Act in 1947.33) The repeal of discriminatory naturalization 
regulations soon followed, lifting bars to citizenship for Chinese and 
other groups that had long faced discrimination in this area.34) Despite 
these reforms, the goal of limiting the entry and incorporation of 
immigrants to whites remained a primary aim of state policy. Chinese 
33) Kelley and Trebilcock, Making of the Mosaic, 321-322. 
34) Carol Lee, "The Road to Enfranchisement: Chinese and Japanese in British Columbia," 
B.C. Studies VOL. 30 (1976): 44-76; F. 1. McEvoy, "' A Symbol of Racial 
Discrimination': The Chinese Immigration Act and Canada 's Relation with China, 
1942-1947," Canadian Ethnic Studies VOL. 14, No. 3 (1982): 24-42. 
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irrunigration thus fell under the terms of P.c. 1930-2115, which 
restricted the range of admissible "Asiatics" to the wives and children 
less than eighteen years of age of Canadian citizens. Other irrunigrant 
groups could apply to bring their family members to Canada after they 
secured legal residency. 
Similarly, the new 1952 Immigration Act's provisions regarding 
irrunigrant admissions bore a striking resemblance those of the past. The 
Governor-in-Council was empowered to prohibit or limit the admission 
of persons by reason of their 
1. Nationality, citizenship, [ethnicity], occupation, class, or geogra-
phical area of origin 
2. Peculiar customs, habits, modes of life, or methods of holding 
property 
3. Unsuitability vis-a-vis climatic, social, industrial, educational, 
labor, health, or other conditions or requirements existing tempor-
arily or otherwise, in Canada or in the area or country from or 
through which such persons came to Canada 
4. Probable inability to become readily assimilated or to assume the 
duties and responsibilities of Canadian citizenship, within a 
reasonable time after admission35) 
The intent of the list was clear: irrunigration was to be closely 
regulated to ensure that Canada's "national character" remained 
essentially "white-European." 
Unraveling: 1952-1962 
Foreign policy considerations made it difficult for Canadian 
policymakers to maintain discriminatory immigration policies. Changes 
35) Hawkins, Canada and Immigration, 102. 
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in international politics were pushing Canada to take increasingly liberal 
positions in the UN and the British Commonwealth; decolonization in 
Africa and Asia had transformed power relations in both organizations 
and placed racial discrimination at the top of their agendas. By 1961, 
African, Asian, and Latin American members constituted two-thirds of 
the UN General Assembly and anti-racist resolutions were becoming 
sharper and more frequent. 36) As Canada's ability to play an 
independent role in world affairs depended on the preservation and 
functioning of both organizations, it could not afford to abstain from 
debates over the international community's handling of matters 
pertaining to racial justice. 
Among the most important challenges confronting the Commonwealth 
during this period was the debate over South Africa's membership. 
Non-white members and potential members made it clear that the future 
of the organization would depend on how the apartheid issue was 
resolved. In an effort to avoid a split that could imperil the 
Commonwealth's future, and Canada's role in international affairs, 
Canada's Prime Minister John Diefenbaker came out strongly against 
the principle of racial discrimination during the Commonwealth's 1961 
Conference in London)7) 
Diefenbaker's crusading anti-racism was a source of concern among 
diplomatic personnel. Canadian consular officials understood that their 
country's public stand against race discrimination could be turned 
36) Linda Freeman, The Ambiguous Champion: Canada and South Africa in the Trudeau 
and Mulroney Years (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1997), 19. 
37) See "Meeting of Prime Ministers of the Commonwealth: Report by Prime Minister John 
G. Diefenbaker on the Commonwealth Prime Ministers' Conference, House of 
Commons, May 16, 1960," in Canadian Foreign Policy /955-/965: Selected Speeches 
and Documents, ed. Arthur E. Blanchette (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1977): 
302-306; Freeman, The Ambiguous Champion, 25 . 
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against it if and when immigration matters were raised.38) Their opinion 
was born out, as external critics of Canadian immigration policy 
continued to draw attention to Canada's reluctance to implement the 
principles it its espoused abroad in its immigration policy. 
Domestic critics, such as the Canadian Council of Churches, the 
Canadian Jewish Congress, the Negro Citizenship Association, and the 
Canadian Congress of Labor, also raised doubts about the government's 
continuing use of racial categories. These advocacy groups challenged 
the government's commitment to anti-discrimination, civil rights, and 
liberal democratic principles by exposing its maintenance of dis-
criminatory immigration policies and administrative practices. Virtually 
all of these appeals included arguments pertaining to Canada's 
obligation to live up to its commitment to international human rights 
and the elimination of discrimination based on race, color or creed. 
The Canadian government reacted to these charges by continuing its 
policy of adjusting regulations to pre-empt or at least limit the force of 
criticisms. Thus the Diefenbaker government introduced a number of 
changes, including doubling India's annual immigration quota from 150 
to 300 persons, raising the annual quota of female domestic workers 
from the British West Indies, and reconsidering previously rejected 
applications for sponsorship to increase the number of entries from 
China,39) Far from providing solutions to the government's problems, 
however, the stretching of the system to accommodate advocacy groups' 
demands was compounding problems. For example, the government's 
effort to assuage the concerns of Canada's East Indian community by 
38) Telegraph from Canadian Trade Commissioner in Port-of Spain to Department of 
External Affairs, Ottawa, March 20, 1961. 
39) David Corbett, "Canada's Immigration Policy, 1957-1962," Inlernalional Journal VOL. 
18, No. 2 (Spring 1963): 173 . 
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doubling India ' s annual immigration quota prompted Pakistan to 
demand that its quota also be doubled.40) While Canadian officials were 
well aware that acceding to Pakistan's demand would run the risk of 
encouraging requests for similar programs from other Commonwealth 
countries they believed they had little choice but to comply, given that 
rejecting Pakistan's demand would likely lead to further accusations of 
discrimination and perhaps even a public airing of Canadian policies in 
the Commonwealth.41 ) 
In short, Canadian immigration officials' ability to meet the 
challenges of lack of fit by tinkering at the margins of the prevailing 
policy regime was running into insurmountable political obstacles. 
Cosmetic solutions aimed at mollifying international and domestic 
opinion while preserving the essential features of the prevailing system 
could not paper over the fact that policies no longer fit changing 
normative contexts. 
Shifting: 1962-1967 
Scholars have assumed that the turn to a "skills-based" admissions 
system was driven by changes in Canada's economic needs and 
diminishing numbers of potential migrants in Europe.42) While there 
certainly was growing consensus within the Department of Citizenship 
and Immigration on the need to revamp the immigration program and 
focus recruitment on skilled workers, professionals, and entrepreneurs,43) 
40) Memorandum to Cabinet: Immigration Agreements with Pakistan and Ceylon, October 
23, 1958. National Archives of Canada, RG 76, VOL. 948, File SF-C-I-I, pI. 2. 
41) Memorandum to Cabinet: Immigration Agreements with Pakistan and Ceylon, October 
23, 1958. National Archives of Canada, RG 76, VOL. 948, File SF-C- I-I , pI. 2. 
42) Alan Green, Immigration and the Postwar Canadian &onomy (Toronto: Macmillan-Hunter 
Press, 1976), 34-35. 
43) See Memorandum from Director of Immigration to Deputy Minister of Department of 
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there is little evidence to suggest that officials believed that this would 
necessarily entail active recruitment from "non-traditional" sources.44) 
Rather, the shift to universal skills-based selection criteria in 1962 was 
primarily aimed at mollifying domestic and international critics of racial 
discrimination. 
This is clear when one considers how officials characterized the 
reforms at the time. In a memorandum to Cabinet outlining the 
Department's proposed measures, the Minister of Citizenship and 
Immigration, Ellen Fairclough, noted that the principle objective of the 
revised regulations was "the elimination of any valid grounds for 
arguing that they contain any restrictions or controls based on racial, 
ethnic or color discrimination." This would be accomplished through the 
amendment of Regulation 20, which constituted "the heart of Canada's 
immigration policy" and the main target of criticism. The chief effect of 
the new regulations would be the elimination of "all grounds for charges 
of discrimination" and placement of "emphasis henceforth on the skills, 
ability and training of the prospective immigrant himself, and on his 
ability to establish himself successfully in Canada."45) 
The amended immigration regulations were tabled in the House of 
Commons on January 19, 1962. In her address to the House, 
Fairclough noted that the intended beneficiaries of the reforms were the 
previously inadmissible classes and their advocates in Canada and 
Citizenship and Immigration: Immigration Policy and Programming as Related to eco-
nomic and employment factors in Canada, December 9, 1960. National Archives of 
Canada, RG 26, VOL. 75, File 1-1-1 , pt. 2. 
44) In fact, efforts were stepped up to generate increased immigration from traditional 
European sources though advertising and other means. It was felt that Canada's passive 
approach to immigration was costing it in terms of attracting highly skilled Europeans. See 
materials in RG 26, VOL. 75, File I-I-S, pt. 3; RG 76, VOL. 909, File 572-15, pt. 2. 
45) Memorandum to Cabinet Re: Immigration Regulations, October 16, 1961. National 
Archives of Canada, RG 26, VOL. 100, File 3-15-1, pt. S. 
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abroad.46) Far from being the product of economic forces, the new 
immigration regulations served a distinctly political end by granting the 
government a more effective means of countering accusations of racism 
and discrimination.47) 
The government' s decision to limit the sponsorship rights of 
non-Europeans and the official but unpublicized policy of maintaining 
a preference for immigrants from Canada's traditional sources also 
illustrate the political nature of the 1962 reforms. Whereas Canadian 
citizens hailing from European and Western Hemisphere countries were 
able to sponsor a full range of family members and relatives, citizens 
from non-European and non-Western Hemisphere countries were limited 
to sponsoring immediate family and a narrower range of relatives. The 
decision to limit the sponsorship rights of citizens from Asia, Africa, 
and most of the Middle East (with the exception of Egypt, Israel, and 
Lebanon) was meant to limit the impact of the policy changes on 
immigration flows . Officials feared that the granting of full sponsorship 
rights to migrants from Africa and especially Asia would prompt a flood 
of visible minorities whose presence could catalyze a negative backlash 
among white Canadians.48) 
Similar anxieties stood behind the decision to interpret the 1962 
reforms passively, leaving the door open to spontaneous applications from 
extremely well qualified migrants from non-traditional sources but only 
actively recruiting immigrants from the United States and Europe.49) Not 
46) Canada, House of Commons Debates, Fifth Session -Twenty Fourth Parliament, Vol. I, 
(1962), 10. 
47) See National Archives of Canada, RG 26. VOL. 100, File 3-15-1 , "Canadian 
Immigration Act and Regulations - Amendments To." 
48) Freda Hawkins, Canada and Immigration: Public Policy and Public Concern (Kingston 
and Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1988). 131. 
49) Memorandum from Assistant Deputy Minister to Deputy Minister, Department of 
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swprisingly, then, doubt as to Canada's real intentions persisted among 
opponents of racial discrimination. The distinctly political response to 
critics embodied in the 1962 reforms proved to be insufficient and 
would have to be elaborated in a more precise system that entailed not 
only a change in general principles but also a more determined effort 
to transform practices and outcomes. 
This was the political background to the 1966 White Paper on 
Immigration Policy. The government of Prime Minister Lester B. 
Pearson pledged to make Canadian immigration policy non-discri-
minatory in practice and not just principle. At the same time, 
policymakers agreed that the sponsored immigration program was 
hurting Canada's economic prospects and contributing to the develop-
ment of potential ethnic problems, through the uncontrolled entry of 
unskilled relatives. Adjusting immigration policy to meet the needs of 
the Canadian economy would require greater emphasis on the 
recruitment of well-educated, highly skilled and employable immigrants 
and the reduction of sponsored flows. 
The White Paper' s central policy recommendations reflected these 
varied preoccupations. First, Canada would accentuate its effort to 
recruit well-educated and highly skilled immigrants. Second, remaining 
discrimination in the realm of sponsorship rights would be ended. 
Rather than discriminating according to national background, the White 
Paper proposed making sponsorship rights for landed immigrants equal 
across the board. Thus, for the first time, all landed immigrants would 
enjoy the right to sponsor the same array of dependents and "eligible 
Citizenship and Immigration, January 21 , 1966. National Archives of Canada, RG 26, 
VOL. 145, File 3-33-6; cited in Vic Satzewich, "Racism and Canadian Immigration 
Policy: The Government's View of Caribbean Migration, 1%2-1966." Canadian Ethnic 
Studies VOL. 21, No. I (1989): 84. 
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relatives." However, after the six-year adjustment period, only Canadian 
citizens would enjoy the right to sponsor the full range of relatives 
stipulated under the proposed system. Policymakers hoped that this 
provision would enhance their grip on the sponsored movement. 50) 
The Department of Manpower and Immigration underestimated the 
irritation the White Paper's proposed limits on family reunification 
would provoke among ethnic groups. Opinions expressed by such 
groups to the Special Joint Committee of the Senate and House of 
Commons on Immigration - appointed by the government to examine 
and report on the White Paper - were often quite negative. While there 
was support for the elimination of remaining discrimination in the 
Immigration Regulations, many continued to question how criteria 
relating to education and skills would be applied without a clearly 
defined set of standards. Without transparency, pronouncements regard-
ing the government's intention to seek out the best and brightest 
regardless of their race continued to ring hollow.51 ) 
The lukewann reception of the White Paper forced the Department of 
Manpower and Immigration to reconsider its approach. An internal task 
force was appointed and charged with devising admissions rules that (i) 
divided the sponsored stream into dependent and non- dependent 
relatives as per the White Paper; (ii) employed a standard set of 
selection criteria; and (iii) were based on the principle of universality. 52) 
After spending several months on the project, the task force arrived at 
a "points system" which employed a standard set of measures for 
50) Canada, House of Commons, Debates, "Tabling of White . Paper on Government 
Policy," (October 14, 1966), 8652. 
51) Canada, Special Joint Committee of the Senate and House of Commons on 
Immigration, Minutes of the Proceedings and Evidence, No.9, 407. 
52) Hawkins, Canada and Immigration, 162. 
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weighing applicants ' qualifications. Prospective immigrants would be 
assigned a score in the categories of: age; education; training; 
occupational skill in demand; knowledge of English or French; relatives 
in Canada; arranged employment; and employment opportunities in area 
of destination. A score based on a personal assessment made by an 
immigration officer in an interview would be added to the total. 
Applicants meeting the threshold set by the government (initially 50 
assessment points) would be admitted as independent immigrants and 
would enjoy the right to sponsor dependents as well as "nominated 
relatives." Nominated relatives were also subject to the points system 
but would be evaluated on a narrower set of criteria. 
The points system thus granted Canadian officials a means of 
demonstrating that immigration policy was based on universal , 
non-discriminatory standards. At the same time, it offered some means 
of regulating sponsored flows, while also linking immigrant admissions 
to economic needs. 
Immigration Reform in the United States, 1945-1965 
Stretching: 1945-1952 
As was the case in Canada, the shift in normative contexts prompted 
by World War II placed the United States' longstanding solution to the 
migration-membership dilemma under strain. Even before war' s end, 
national security concerns propelled the elimination of the Chinese 
Exclusion Act, as President Franklin D. Roosevelt's administration 
scrambled to neutralize Japanese claims the United States' bar on 
Chinese immigration made its positions on human rights hypocritical. At 
home, the Citizens'Committee to Repeal Chinese Exclusion also 
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claimed that the exclusion laws were at odds with America 's 
commitment to defeating fascism. They were repealed in December 
1943 and replaced with a symbolic quota authorizing the admission of 
105 Chinese immigrants annually. Similar quotas were established for 
India and the Philippines. 53) 
After the war, critics continued to argue that the outright exclusion of 
most non-white migrants and tight controls against southern and eastern 
Europeans stipulated under the National Origins Quotas made a mockery 
of American leaders ' claims that their country was the world's beacon of 
liberty and freedom. Conscious of the United States' new role in the 
postwar world, President Harry S. Truman also argued that racial 
discrimination was hampering America's efforts to counter the growing 
influence of its ideological rival, the Soviet Union, both in Europe and the 
newly independent states of the "Third World." Thus, Truman supported 
the abolition of the quota system and other racially discriminatory 
policies, arguing that failure to act aggressively would assist "those with 
competing philosophies [to] prove our democracy an empty fraud and our 
nation a consistent oppressor of underprivileged people. "54) 
National security considerations also lay behind Truman's cham-
pioning of American relief for the millions of "Displaced Persons" 
(DPs) crowding continental Europe.55) The United States led the way in 
establishing the International Refugee Organization and its successor, 
the office of the United Nations' High Commissioner for Refugees. At 
home, Truman's linking of the refugee issue to Cold War considerations 
53) John D. Skrentny, The Minority Rights Revolution (Cambridge: Harvard University 
Press, 2002), 39-44. 
54) Cited in Daniel 1. Tichenor, Dividing Lines: The Politics of Immigration Control in 
America (Princeton: Princeton University Pres, 2002), 179. 
55) Skrentny, The Minority Rights Revolution, 47. 
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helped him convince Congress to pass the Displaced Persons Act in 
May 1948.56) In response to continuing pressure from the White House, 
the terms of the law were expanded in 1950. In all, 409,696 persons 
were admitted under the Displaced Persons Act, making up over half of 
the refugees admitted between 1946 and 1965.57) Approximately 
300,000 more were admitted under other special refugee measures 
enacted during the same period. 58) 
While most American politicians agreed that the onset of the Cold 
War meant that explicitly racist dimensions of America's immigration 
and naturalization policies required modification, a significant majority 
rejected Truman's calls for radical reforms, insisting instead that the 
goals of established policies were legitimate and should therefore be 
maintained. This point is clear in a 1950 report of the Senate Judiciary 
Committee's subcommittee on immigration: 
Without giving credence to any theory of Nordic superiority, the sub-
committee believes that the adoption of the national origins quota formula 
was a rational and logical method of numerically restricting immigration in 
such a manner as to best preserve the sociological and cultural balance in 
the population of the United States. There is no doubt that it favored the 
peoples of northern and western Europe over those of southern and eastern 
Europe, but the subcommittee holds that the peoples who made the greatest 
contribution to the development of this country were fully justified in de-
termining that the country was no longer a field for further colonization and, 
56) Aristide R. Zolberg, "From Invitation to Interdiction: U.S. Foreign Policy and 
Immigration since 1945," in Threatened Peoples, Threatened Borders: World Migration 
and u.s. Policy, ed. Michael S. Teitelbaum and Myron Weiner (New York: w. W. 
Norton and Company, 1995), 123. 
57) . Aristide R. Zolberg, A Nation by Design: Immigration Policy and the Fashioning of 
America (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2006). 
58) Zolberg, "From Invitation to Interdiction," 125. 
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henceforth, further immigration would not only be restricted but directed to 
admit immigrants considered to be more readily assimilable because of the 
similarity of their cultural background to those of the principal components 
of our population. 59) 
Like Mackenzie King's 1947 statement, the subcommittee's report 
made it clear that American politicians preferred to respond to the 
exigencies of lack of fit by stretching established policies. This was the 
intent of the 1952 Immigration Act, also known as the McCarran-
Walter Act, after its sponsors, Senator Pat McCarran (D-NV) and the 
chair of the House Immigration Subcommittee, Representative Francis 
E. Walter (D-PA). While the 1952 law formally abolished racist criteria 
in immigration and naturalization policy, it maintained the fundamental 
features of the national origins quota system. Thus, while the "Asiatic 
Barred Zone" was eliminated, only 2000 visas per year were allotted to 
individuals born within the so-called "Asia-Pacific Triangle" - a region 
spanning India, China, Japan, and the Pacific Islands. The law also held 
that individuals "of as much as one-half Asian blood born outside the 
Triangle be charged against the quota of his country of Asian-Pacific 
ancestry."60) This was meant to block the entry of "Asiatics" hoping to 
gain admission to the United States under the quotas of countries 
outside the Asia-Pacific Triangle. Furthermore, the weighing of visa 
quotas In favor of immigrants from northwestern Europe was 
maintained, as immigrants from these traditional source countries were 
considered to be better able to assimilate into American society. This 
59) Cited in Marion T. Bennett, "The Immigration and Nationality (McCarran-Walter) Act 
of 1952, as Amended to 1965," The Annals of the American Academy of Political and 
Social Science (September 1966): 129-130. 
60) Bennett, "The Immigration and Nationality (McCarran-Walter) Act of 1952," 131. 
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point of view was endorsed by the law's supporters, which included 
veterans' associations, patriotic groups, and organized labor. The bill's 
sponsors regarded its lifting of barriers to naturalization for immigrants 
from Asia as a symbolic concession to those concerned about racial 
inequality. The reform of naturalization policy would pose "no real 
threat to the nation's ethnic makeup, since the vast majority of 
non-citizens entering the country came from Europe. " 61 ) 
Congress passed the McCarran-Walter bill in June 1952. Truman 
vetoed the bill, arguing that it would "perpetuate injustices of long 
standing against many other nations of the world, hamper the efforts we 
are making to rally the men of East and West alike to the cause of 
freedom, and intensify the repressive and inhumane aspects of our 
immigration procedures. " 62) Congress easily overrode his veto, making 
the McCarran-Walter bill law.63) 
The passage of the 1952 Immigration and Nationality Act highlighted 
the influence of immigration restrictionists in Congress and the 
durability of established policies. While America's relatively new role 
as a global superpower made the negative repercussions of 
discriminatory policies clear, policymakers in Congress opted to make 
cosmetic changes in the hope that this minimal response would diffuse 
criticism while preserving the United States' prevailing ethnic 
composition. 
Unraveling: 1952-1958 
Critics of discriminatory immigration admissions policies correctly 
61 ) Tichenor, Dividing Lines, 196. 
62 ) Congressional Quarterly Almanac, (1952): 159. 
63) Jeffrey Togman, The Ramparts 0/ Nations: Institutions and Immigration Policies in 
France and the United States (Westport, Connecticut: Praeger, 2002), 36. 
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viewed the McCarran-Walter Act as a symbolic gesture that offered 
little in the way of substantive reform. This point of view is nicely 
captured in the following "warning" issued by the National Association 
for the Advancement of Colored People: 
McCarran says his Bill has eliminated racial restrictions. Don't Let Him 
Fool You. It Hasn't. In a very subtle way, this Bill draws the racial line 
even more tightly for the people from the Asia-Pacific area and the West 
Indies.64) 
Similarly, Senators Herbert Lehman (D-NY) and Hubert Humphrey 
(D-MN) argued that the maintenance of an immigration system based on 
national origins quotas meant that the United States was not honoring 
its commitment to fundamental liberal-democratic principles. Truman 
went several steps further while campaigning on behalf of the Demo-
cratic Party's presidential nominee, Adlai Stevenson, arguing that by 
reaffirming the national origins quota system, conservative Republicans 
in Congress had perpetuated "a philosophy of racial superiority 
developed by the Nazis, which we thought we had destroyed when we 
defeated Nazi Germany and liberated Europe. "65) Truman linked support 
for the McCarran-Walter Act to the Republicans' presidential nominee, 
Dwight Eisenhower and his running mate, Richard Nixon.66) Regardless 
of their veracity, these charges compelled Eisenhower to insist that he 
too rejected the principles underlying the national origins quotas, thus 
64) Cited in Desmond King, Making Americans: Immigration. Race. and the Origins of 
Diverse Democracy (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 2000), 237. 
65) "Truman Assails Eisenhower as Supporting Isolationists," The New York Times, 
(October 18, 1952). 
66) "Eisenhower Accepts 'Nazi' Racial Views, Truman Declares," Washington Evening 
Star, (October 17, 1952). 
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placing him on the side of the refonners even before his victory in the 
November election. 
Eisenhower was not alone in questioning the political merits of 
supporting the McCarran Walter Act. The 1950s witnessed a steady shift 
in elite opinion on the national origins system. The discrediting of 
scientific racism in the postwar period played an important role in this 
regard. 67) This was very much in evidence in the work of the 
Presidential Commission on Immigration and Naturalization, appointed 
by Truman in September 1952. The Commission's experts challenged 
the assumptions regarding race that underlay the quota acts, arguing that 
the differences between groups that seemed so obvious earlier in the 
century were based on faulty science. The Commission's report, Whom 
We Shall Welcome, concluded: "the best scientific evidence available 
today is that there [are] no . .. inborn differences of personality, 
character, intelligence, or cultural or social traits among races. The basic 
racist assumption of the national origins system is invalid. "68) 
Consequently, restrictionists could no longer claim the authority of 
science when defending their positions. While they adjusted to this new 
situation by moderating their language and offering cosmetic refonns, 
they were increasingly on the defensive, as critics continued to highlight 
the lack of fit between the United States' immigration policies and its 
putative commitment to liberal-democratic principles and human rights. 
The strength of the refonn movement was greatly enhanced when 
organized labor reversed its position on the national origins quota 
system in 1955.69) Labor's turnaround was driven by ideological 
67) Tichenor, Dividing Lines, 179-180. 
68) Commission on Immigration and Nationalization, Whom We Shall Welcome 
(Washington, D.C. : Government Printing Office, 1953). 
69) Tichenor, Dividing Lines, 203-204. 
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changes on the Left, the merger of the AFL with the more progressive 
CIO, and a mellowing of fears concerning the threat to jobs posed by 
legal immigrants (based in part on the remarkable growth in the 
American economy during this period). Labor's shift had a ripple effect, 
as it also brought the Democratic Party more firmly on the side of the 
reform movement, a trend that was reinforced by northern De-
mocrats'strong support for the Civil Rights Movement. Changing norms 
were driving a realignment of domestic forces, as ethnic groups, 
organized labor, religious organizations, civil liberties groups, and the 
liberal wing of the Democratic Party formed an increasingly influential 
coalition dedicated to the pursuit of fundamental reforms in immigration 
policy. High profile statements, such as Senator John F. Kennedy's A 
Nation of Immigrants and Hubert Humphrey's The Stranger at Our 
Gate, increased the profile of immigration reform nationally and helped 
to "frame a pro-immigrant narrative ... that further eroded the early-
twentieth-century 'policy paradigm' legitimating quotas."70) Slow but 
steady progress in the area of domestic anti-discrimination legislation 
also "undermined the legitimacy of the national origins system posted 
on America's door."71) 
Foreign policy considerations complemented domestic political 
pressures. President Eisenhower argued that the national origins quotas 
made it overly difficult for the United States to offer sanctuary to 
refugees "fleeing Communism." He thus demanded and received special 
powers to override quota limits, in order to quickly respond to refugee 
movements.12) Although restrictionists in Congress viewed such con-
cessions as a worthwhile price to pay in order to maintain the national 
70) Tichenor, Dividing Lines, 205. 
71) Zolberg, A Nation by Design. 
72) King, Making Americans, 239; Skrentny, The Minority Rights Revolution, 47-48. 
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origins quota system, each exception highlighted the McCarran-Walter 
Act's failure to accord with America's foreign policy concerns and 
commitments to human rights and liberal-democratic principles. A 
combination of domestic and international pressures was unraveling the 
national origins quota system, creating space for the emergence of new 
ideas in line with the prevailing normative context. 
Shifting: 1958-1965 
Momentum for immigration reform increased after the 1958-midterm 
elections, as liberal Democrats keen on pursuing change won a majority 
in the House of Representatives. This trend was reinforced by John F. 
Kennedy's victory in the 1960 presidential election. The Democratic 
Party included immigration reform in its electoral platform and made an 
effort to appeal to ethnic voters in northern cities, often employing 
language that emphasized civil rights and respect for cultural pluralism. 
Many felt that Kennedy's commitment to immigration reform and 
dynamism would quickly spell the end of the McCarran-Walter Act. 
This hope grew after Kennedy introduced and helped pass a bill that 
authorized the immigration of 18,000 foreign relatives outside the quota 
system. The 1961 Act also granted quotas to the newly independent 
states of the Caribbean and gave non-quota status to many close 
relatives of American citizens who were on waiting lists in Italy, 
Greece, Portugal and elsewhere.73) 
Despite this promising start, hopes for a rapid and fundamental reform 
of immigration policy were frustrated by institutional factors. Specifically, 
immigration restrictionists still exercised a great deal of power in 
Congress; conservative Republicans and southern Democrats often held 
73) Bennett, "The Immigration and Nationality (McCarran-Walter) Act of 1952," 135-136. 
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Congress; conservative Republicans and southern Democrats often held 
the chairmanships of important congressional committees and 
subcommittees and could therefore stall initiatives and manipulate the 
legislative process. Wary of provoking a fight with the "committee 
barons," Kennedy waited for nearly two years before submitting an 
immigration bill to Congress, doing so only after Walter's death in 1963. 
The "Kennedy bill" called for sweeping changes, including the 
abolition of the national origins quota system over five years, the 
elimination of the Asia-Pacific Triangle, and the granting of preferences 
to immigrants with work-related skills.?4) The bill envisioned the 
transferring of individual countries' quotas to a world quota pool, of 
which 50 per cent would be reserved for persons with special skills and 
training. The other 50 percent would be reserved for spouses and 
children under twenty-one and married sons and daughters of US 
citizens over the age of twenty-one. Furthermore, the proposal rejected 
any limits to immigration from the Western Hemisphere and made 
special allowances for the reception of refugees. 75) Representative 
Emmanuel Celler (D-NY) and Senator Philip Hart (D-MI) introduced 
the legislation to Congress. 
The Kennedy bill enjoyed the support of the American Immigration 
and Citizenship committee, a group that included the American Civil 
liberties Union, religious organizations, trade unions, ethnic asso-
ciations, refugee support groups, and international organizations. 
High-ranking administration officials, including Secretary of State Dean 
74) David M. Reimers, "Recent Immigration Policy: An Analysis,". in The Gateway: U.S. 
Immigration Issues and Policies, ed. Barry R. Chiswick (Washington, D.C. : American 
Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, 1982): 13-53. 
75) Abba P. Schwartz, The Open Society (New York: William Morrow and Company, 
1968), 114; Skrentny, The Minority Rights Revolution, 50-51 . 
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Rusk, also came out strongly in favor of the bill,76) Speaking before a 
subcommittee of the House Judiciary Committee, Rusk noted that the 
national origins quota system was hindering American foreign policy 
objectives; eliminating the system would aid in the fight against enemy 
propaganda.77) 
Despite this broad support, powerful members of congressional 
committees, including the chair of the Senate Judiciary Committee, 
James Eastland (D-MS) and the new chair of the House Immigration 
Subcommittee, Michael Feighan (D-OH), opposed the Kennedy bill, 
tying it up in committees through 1963 and 1964. Indeed, the opponents 
of immigration reform ensured that very little progress was made up 
until Kennedy's assassination. 
The push for reform resumed under President Lyndon Johnson. 
Although Johnson had supported the McCarran-Walter Act in 1952, like 
Truman and Eisenhower before him, he now believed that the law stood 
in the way of America's foreign policy interests. The national origins 
quota system was also incompatible with Johnson's position of civil 
rights reform,78) Johnson used his considerable political skills and the 
political capital earned through his impressive 1964 electoral victory to 
surmount the obstructions set up by restrictionists in Congress. Among 
his most important successes in this regard was convincing Senator 
Eastland to "temporarily" relinquish his chairmanship of the Senate 
Judiciary Committee to the more liberal Edward Kennedy of 
Massachusetts. Johnson also pressured congressional Democrats to 
increase the size of the House Immigration Subcommittee, thus limiting 
76) Skrentny, The Minority Rights Revolution, 50 . 
77) Skrentny, The Minority Rights Revolution, 52. 
78) James G. Gimpel and James R. Edwards, Jr., The Congressional Politics of Immigration 
Reform (Boston: Allyn and Bacon, 1999), 102. 
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Feighan's ability to block the legislation's progress. 
Restrictionists in the House and Senate responded to Johnson's 
maneuvers by using their power to amend the legislation. Perhaps most 
importantly, Feighan rejected what had come to be known as the 
Hart-Celler bill ' s preference for immigrants with special skills and 
training and demanded that preferences be granted to family members 
instead. Feighan made this demand in response to pressure from 
organized labor (whose members feared an influx of skilled workers) 
and traditional supporters of immigration restrictions.79) Senate 
conservatives, such as Sam Ervin of (D-NC) and Everett Dirksen 
(R-IL), supported Feighan's position. Ervin, Dirksen and other 
restrictionists believed that it would help perpetuate the effect of the 
national origins quota system by favoring nationalities already in the 
United States. In an effort to limit the entry of non-whites from the 
Caribbean and Central and South America, Congressional restrictionists 
also called for a ceiling on immigration from the Western Hemisphere 
- a region that had previously been exempt from numerical limits. 
Unwilling to wage a battle over either Feighan or Ervin's amendments 
and eager to pass the legislation while he still enjoyed an advantage 
over Congress, Johnson opted to strike a deal with his opponents, 
concluding (correctly) that the switch in preferences to family members 
and limitations on Western Hemisphere immigration would not come at 
too great a political cost. 80) 
The system established by the amended Act granted 170,000 visas for 
immigrants originating in the Eastern Hemisphere (with no country 
receiving more than 20,000 spots) and 120,000 visas for immigrants 
79) Cited in Skrentny, The Minority Rights Revolution, 55 . 
80) Edward M. Kennedy, "The Immigration Act of 1965," 147. 
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from the Western Hemisphere (with no country limits). Spouses, minor 
children and parents of American citizens were exempted from the 
numerical limits. As a result of the compromise forged between Johnson 
and his congressional opponents, 74 per cent of yearly visa allotments 
were dedicated to family reunification, with preference granted to 
brothers and sisters of American citizens; only 20 per cent were 
reserved for immigrants with occupational skills. Refugees received six 
per cent of the yearly visa allotment.81) 
Conclusion 
The 1965 Immigration Act's abolition of strict controls on migration 
from the Asia-Pacific Triangle allowed for an increase of Asian 
immigration from 1.5 million in 1970 to 13.1 million in 2000.82) 
Immigration from Central and South America, Africa, and the Middle 
East also increased sharply, transforming America's cities and making 
the United States a highly diverse, multicultural society. Similarly, 
Canada's demographic profile was transformed as a result of increasing 
migration from so-called "non-traditional sources." Whereas the vast 
majority of immigrants arriving in Canada up to the late 1960s came from 
Europe, by 1971 36 percent of total migration originated from the "Third 
World" by 1980 this figure had reached 81 per cent. By 2002, immigrants 
from Mainland China-formerly targets of harsh restrictions-represented 
the largest single group entering Canada, at 15 per cent of a total intake 
81) Zolberg, A Nation by Design. 
82) US Census Bureau, Facts for Features, April 19, 2004, available online at: http://www. 
census. go v I Press- Rei ease/ w w w I re I eas es / arc h i ves/ fac ts _ for _ fea tures _ spe-
cial editionslOO 1738 .html. 
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of 228,575 and were followed by immigrants from India, Pakistan, and 
the Philippines at 13, 6, and 5 per cent respectively.83) As a result of 
these changes in immigration policy, the vision of a predominantly white 
European Canada defended in Prime Minister Mackenzie King's 1947 
speech to Parliament was effectively overturned. 
I have argued that the changes in immigration and citizenship policies 
that allowed for these changes were driven by the shift in normative 
context catalyzed by World War II. The discrediting of scientific racism, 
rise of human rights, and transformation of the global system as a 
consequence of decolonisation and the Cold War cast older, 
discriminatory policies in a new light, exposing a lack of fit between 
Canada and the United States' commitment to liberal-democratic prin-
ciples, on the one hand, and their management of the migration-
membership dilemma, on the other. Lack of fit drove the stretching and 
unraveling of established frameworks and, ultimately, led to the 
introduction of policies based on new standards in line with prevailing 
nonns. Hence, immigration refonn was not driven by purely economic 
factors, as is sometimes assumed, but by a distinctively nonnative 
politics reflective of shifts in liberal-democratic principles. 
I have also demonstrated how differences in political context and 
institutions influenced the course of policy shifting. In Canada, the 
autonomy of the executive branch granted ministers and civil servants a 
83) Citizenship and Immigration Canada, The Monitor No. 1/2 (Spring 2003): <http://www. 
cic.gc/englishlmonitor/issueOl /02-immigrants.html>. For discussion see Doreen M. 
Indra, "Changes in Canadian Immigration Patterns Over the Past Decade with a Special 
Reference to Asia," in Visible Minorities and Multiculturalism: Asians in Canada, ed. 
K. Victor Ujimoto and Gordon Hirabayashi (Toronto: Butterworths, 1980); Warren 
Kalbach, "A Demographic Overview of Racial and Ethnic Groups in Canada," and Jean 
Leonard Elliot and Augie Fleras, "Immigration and the Canadian Ethnic Mosaic," both 
in Race and Ethnic Relations in Canada, ed. Peter S. Li (Toronto: Oxford University 
Press, 1990). 
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were important, there was no need to strike compromises with 
well-positioned rivals. Rather, the challenge for Canadian civil servants 
lay in devising a solution that balanced the government's core objectives: 
the elimination of racial discrimination, control over sponsored migration, 
and encouragement of skilled immigration. The points system satisfied all 
of these objectives. The power vested to the Prime Minister and Cabinet 
via Canada's Westminster system ensured that once it was devised it was 
very quickly implemented. Conversely, the more fragmented American 
political system and its multiple veto points forced Johnson to broker a 
compromise with restrictionists in Congress, despite the relative weakness 
of the latter and strength of the former. Thus, the Johnson ad-
ministration's hope of granting preference to immigrants with special 
skills and training gave way to a system that grants disproportionate 
preference to family members. It is therefore deeply ironic that some 
contemporary critics of US immigration policy complain that the changes 
introduced by the 1965 Act threaten the maintenance of "American 
national identity" by allowing for "immense and continuing immigration 
from Latin America, especially from Mexico."84) It appears that the very 
tool restrictionists tried to use to limit pluralization in the past has 
become their central preoccupation today. 
I • .:il~~ : 2007.11 .16. 
I ~AH?~)~~ : 2008.4.10. 
I ~I~.~i!~ : 2008.4.18. 
84) The quotation is from Samuel P. Huntington, "The Hispanic Challenge," Foreign Policy 
136 (March/April 2004). Huntington explores the putative threat unrestrained immigra-
tion poses to American national identity at length in Who Are We ? The Challenges to 
America's National Identity (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2004). For a trenchant cri-
tique of Huntington's argument see Rogers Smith's review of the book in Political 
Science Quarterly VOL. 119 (2004): 421-422. 
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Between Global Norms and Domestic Institutions: 
Postwar Immigration Policymaking in Canada and the 
United States 
Triadafilos Triadafilopoulos 
(University of Toronto) 
Although both Canada and the United States are self-declared immigration 
countries, their means of regulating admissions are quite different. Whereas the 
United States privileges family reunification, Canada's "points system" grants 
policymakers greater flexibility in tailoring immigration flows to meet changing 
economic needs. This paper explores the origins of these distinct approaches. 
I argue the two states' policies have similar roots: In the post-World War II era, 
changing norms pertaining to race, ethnicity, and human rights cast longstanding 
discriminatory policies in Canada and the United States in a highly critical light. 
Opponents of racial discrimination in immigration policy took advantage of this new 
normative context to highlight the lack of fit between Canada and the United States' 
commitment to liberal norms and human rights and their extant policy regimes. This 
pressure set in motion comparable processes of policy "stretching" and 
"unraveling," which culminated in policy "shifting" in the mid-1960s. Processes of 
policy change were, however, subject to quite different political dynamics. Canada's 
institutional configuration granted the executive branch and bureaucracy a high 
degree of autonomy; policy change therefore accorded to models of elite learning. 
Conversely, the greater openness of the American political system and the pivotal 
role of Congressional committees led to a more politicized process. As a result, the 
executive branch's efforts to recast immigration policy in economic terms, as in 
Canada, failed. The result was a patchwork policy that aimed to mol1ify distinct and 
conflicting interests. Thus, while Canada and the United States both replaced 
discriminatory policies with more liberal alternatives, the objectives of their 
respective policies were quite different. 
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